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The current fiscal environment, with its budgetary uncer-
tainty, forces the Department of Defense to ensure it is
receiving the maximum readiness for each dollar spent. This
thesis presents an analysis of the current VP readiness
system as a method for efficient and effective allocation of
resources. It traces the funding for VP squadrons and dis-
cusses the training background of individual crews and their
specific crew members. It describes the entire military
readiness system and how the VP readiness system, as it is
used today, relates to this system. The thesis develops a
model to illustrate the relationships between resource usage
and readiness within the VP community. Several approaches to
validate the current VP readiness system were made using this
model. However, only limited significant relationships were
found. Numerous recommendations to improve the current VP
readiness system are made based on the results obtained in
testing the model.
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I. BACKGROUND
Since World War II, Maritime Patrol Aviation (MPA) or VP,
as it has come to be known in Navy parlance, has played a
critical role in the nation's defense. VP squadrons are among
the few military assets which encounter Soviet forces daily
through their ocean surveillance and anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) missions. These daily confrontations are an important
part of our national strategy objective to deter aggression.
The MPA mission will undoubtedly be as essential to our future
defense posture as it is today.
With the recent events in the Soviet Union as well as
Eastern Europe as a backdrop, there is little doubt the
military budget will be cut to provide the nation with a
"peace dividend." As this paper is being written, a defense
budget was submitted to Congress for fiscal year (FY) 1991
with 1.9% growth over FY 1990 (Facts on File, 1990, p.60).
This is a 3 to 4% decrease in real funding when inflation
effects are taken into account. This trend of funding for the
military budget coes not appear to be a rare occurrence.
Future military budgets are not predicted to increase in real
terms for at least several years.
These historically significant events, as well as the
requirements of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, more commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-
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Hollings (GRH) Act, will certainly have a major impact on the
defense budget. The Act has specific goals of deficit reduc-
tion, calling for a balanced budget by 1993. It calls for 50%
of the required outlay reductions to be absorbed by the
military (Collender, 1987, p. 57). Austere military budgets
will undoubtedly continue for years to come.
These defense cuts traditionally come from areas within
the Department of Defense (DOD) budget where the money is
spent relatively quickly over shorter periods of time. These
areas have come to be known as "fast money" expense accounts.
Fast money has a faster outlay rate and enables Congress to
cut budget authority on an almost dollar-for-dollar basis with
outlays, and generally fast money accounts are thought to
involve less "pork barrel" politics than other accounts such
as procurement and construction (Blake, 1988, p. 47).
The fast money account that is the most vulnerable to GRH
cuts is the Operation & Maintenance or O&M account. This
account "finances the cost of on-going operations (i.e. base
operations, civilian personnel salaries, steam and flying
hours, maintenance of real property, training, etc.)."
(Practical Comtrollership Manual, 1989, p. A12) Outlays from
this account more than any other determine how "ready" a unit
is to go to war.
Joshua Epstein, a research associate for the Brookings
Institute, provides the following analysis of GRH's effect on
the defense budget:
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Beyond this uncontrollable 40 percent of each year's
outlays another 30 percent or so is needed simply to pay,
house, and administer the defense establishment. Thus if
large deficit reductions--that is, cuts in actual
spending--are to be made in the current year, and the
major capital projects, such as new strategic and naval
programs, are protected from reductions; readiness--which
has grown with the budget as a whole--is bound to suffer
badly. (U.S. Congress, 1987D, p. 78)
The capability of our military has traditionally been
measured in terms of four pillars. These four pillars which
support the military's mission are force structure, m der-
nization, sustainability and readiness. (Practical
Comptrollership Manual, 1989, p. A12) Out of these pillars,
readiness more than any other does not lend itself to easy
measurement. This is understandable because, by its very
nature, readiness is difficult to quantify and not really
known until the battle begins.
If our military forces are not prepared to fight, they can
not provide the required deterrent effect that is a tremendous
part of our overall defense. The readiness of our military
and in particular our MPA assets to accomplish their missions
is of obvious concern to the nation's leadership. Part of
this concern is due to the fact that during World War II the
allies were not ready to combat the submarine threat. Anti-
submarine warfare played a key role in the outcome of the war.
By virtue of modern warfare, the United States is not going to
have time to gear up for the next major war; it must be ready
to fight at a moment's notice. In order to measure a unit's
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readiness to fight, we must first be comfortable with what is
meant by military readiness.
Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense in the Nixon
administration, defines readiness as "the ability of the cur-
rent configured force structure to perform its assigned
mission." (Laird, 1980, p. 2) Readiness is concerned with
such things as a battleship's ability to steam to a location
and put ordnance on its target when directed or the ability of
an MPA squadron to detect, to localize, to track and to
destroy enemy submarines when required. It is the ability of
military units to do the job appointed to them whenever and
wherever the mission is assigned.
The real challenge of the military leadership is to look
for ways to create the "peace dividend" without affecting the
military's readiness. This means ensuring every dollar is
spent with the goal of maintaining readiness. While programs
of efficiency and effectiveness are not new, cuts within
recent history as significant as previously described are.
Unless management systems can be designed to obtain the most
"bang for the buck," these cuts will go to the very fiber of
the military. Decreased military budgets apparently are the
trend of the future; management systems must be designed to
ensure readiness is maintained at its peak for the level of
funding.
Any system used to measure readiness can do so only
through the use of surrogates or substitutes. Many examples
4
can be provided of units rated high in readiness but
performing poorly in combat and vice versa (Laird, 1980, p.
17). The problem with any readiness measurement system is
that readiness is ephemeral; it changes from minute to minute.
Most systems or measures that try to systematically detect and
track those changes inevitably fall short in trying to keep up
with the sheer volume of them. This thesis will look at the
current Maritime Patrol Aviation or VP readiness system to
access its performance as a management control tool for the
efficient and effective allocation of limited resources.
A. MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN THE MILITARY
A management control system is used to fa_ 1litate the
effective accomplishment of an organization's mission. The
absence of a well designed control system makes the organiza-
tion vulnerable to inefficiencies which could threaten its
very existence (Ramanathan, 1982, p. 2). The success of a
management control system is evaluated on the basis of how
well the system leads to efficient and effective performance.
Simply stated, "effective" means "doing the job you promised
to do" and "efficient" means "doing the job with minimum use
of resources." (Ramanathan, 1982, p. 4-6) The readiness
system is a management control system for the military.
Any management control system must be directed to measure
the performance of the organization with respect to some
standard. It then must feedback to management to effect change
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in order to more closely match the standard. Profit is
perhaps the largest motivator and measure of effectiveness and
efficiency in a business organization. Absent this motive,
nonprofit organizations are very limited in coming up with
measurement standards. Readiness has become the "profit
motive" of military managers. Developing good measures of
this amorphous concept has become a big challenge for military
managers.
Inasmuch as the military will continue to exist (or
operate or function) and will not generate a profit, it must
develop good measures of performance. If the military cannot
come up with an acceptable quantitative measure of its readi-
ness (in a sense, profit to society) which can be tied to the
budget, Congressional reductions of requested funds will
undoubtedly occur. Funding then reverts to those with the
best quantification of dollars relative to performance
(Coleman, 1978, p. 1).
The VP readiness system is used as both a predictor of
performance and as a management control system. The patrol
aviation community, as well as the whole Navy, has tried to
come up with measurements which, when incorporated into the
readiness management control system, will be effective in
ensuring that commanding officers spend their limited resour-
ces in the most beneficial way to the Navy.
This thesis will look at the current VP readiness system
and try to determine how well the system can both predict
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performance and motivate managers to spend money in the most
cost effective manner. It will first look at the current
system as a predictor of effectiveness. It will then look at
proven performance and see if any measurable factors can be
identified as being significant contributors to this perfor-
mance. This, as has been shown, is very critical in times of
reduced budgets. If an organization cannot prove its worth by
tying expenditures to performance, it does not fare well in
the cutback environment which is inevitable for the future.
B. INTRODUCTION TO THE VP READINESS SYSTEM
As has been pointed out, the Department of Defense budget
is in for some lean times ahead. Every program will be looked
at in order that a fair assessment can be made of its value to
our overall defense strategy. The VP program is a major part
of this strategy and will undoubtedly be looked at. The more
effectively VP is able to translate resource expenditures into
readiness the better it can defend its budget as evaluated
against other programs' budgets.
The authors see the key to an effective translation of
resources to readiness for the VP community as lying within
the current VP readiness system. The VP readiness system is
the management control system which determines how resources
are used within the community. Improving this system serves
to improve VP's ability to justify its funding levels within
a restricted budget.
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A management control system which motivates managers to
expend available resources in such a way as to maximize
readiness has eluded the VP community, according to a Comman-
der, Patrol Wings Pacific (CPWP) representative. As a former
VP squadron Commanding Officer (CO), he stated that, if a
critical flight was needed, he would not use the ranking
developed from the readiness system to determine which crew
was sent. He would instead choose a crew from a personally
developed list he felt incorporated all the elements, both
tangible and intangible, which gave the crew the best chance
for success (Evans, 1990). The personally developed and the
readiness system lists may be very different. According to
Anthony and Herzlinger, this is not unexpected since, "A
judgement made by a qualified person is usually a better
measure of the quality of performance than any objective
measure." (Anthony and Herzlinger, 1980, p. 237)
The VP community has historically used a readiness figure
termed Average Crew Readiness (ACR) as one of the critical
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) within its readiness system.
ACR is derived from individual Crew Designation Levels (CDLs)
which attempt to quantify different elements of individual
crew training into one figure. Basically, CDL applies to the
individual crew readiness and ACR applies to the squadron as
a whole. Chapter VI of this thesis will explain how ACR and
CDL are developed and their relationship to the overall Navy
and military readiness system.
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Traditionally, CDLs are considered to be inflated and at
best just an indication of crew performance. However, this
measure is used as a tool to provide management with the
information necessary to base expenditure decisions. COs feel
a motivation to maximize readiness as measured by ACR, or
"paper readiness."' Herein lies the dilemma which motivated
this thesis.
Although CDL is used to signify readiness, it really
relates to qualifications, or the process by which paper
readiness is gained. It may relate to readiness if qualifica-
tions do in fact lead to readiness. There needs to be an
established link between paper readiness and actual readiness
to ensure resources are expended efficiently. The following
model indicates how the authors perceive the current VP
management control system:
IwsT ours
RESORC:ES/ LUALFICTION CD strength of link
EEOBACK I READINESS...
Figure 1. Current VP Management Control System
Paper readiness is the readiness as measured by CRF and
ACR; it may or may not reflect actual readiness.
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Resources such as flight hours and Weapon System Trainer
(WST)2 hours are used by the squadron COs to gain qualifica-
tions, or "quals." These quals translate directly into CDL
and ACR used in the VP readiness system. The readiness
system's feedback loop provides information to the CO on how
resources can be expended so that ACR can be maximized. The
authors contend this feedback bears little relationship to the
direction that would be provided if the "true" readiness3
shortfalls were known or even to the resource expenditure if
the CO was left to his own devi ,' to maximize readiness.
Since ACR is perceived as an indicator of the commanding
officer's ability to manage resources, he is forced by the
system to expend resources on a system that may not really
furnishing him with needed information. Commander, Patrol
Wing Ten at Moffett Field stated that it was more important
for each crew to fly ASW training missions at least once a
month than to do qualifications. He stated he did not rank
his COs on the basis of their readiness figures, although the
COs felt they were rated according to these figures. He was
not concerned about the graded performance of the crew as much
2 A WST is the main ground training device used by VP
crews to obtain qualifications and training.
3 True Readiness is a reflection of how ready a crew is
to do a mission, given the ability to incorporate all
information into the assessment. Whenever the term readiness
is used alone it will be referring to true readiness.
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as the fact that they were able to experience actual training.
Every training event builds experience that will eventually
lead to success. He is willing to let "paper readiness" fall,
if necessary, to improve each crew's specific weaknesses
(Ryan, 1990). He, in effect, indicated that ACR's
relationship to readiness was in question.
The first GRH budget cuts were applied during FY-88 and
amounted to a 15% flight hour budget reduction for CPWP
forces. Since CPWP distributes flight hour funding to the
squadrons, it was required to evaluate the expected adverse
consequence of this reduction on readiness. As a member of
the staff, one of the researchers was personally involved in
that evaluation.
Although numerous attempts were made to arrive at an
accurate prediction, the readiness system proved to be of
little value in analyzing this problem. The best guess was
that some drop in readiness may occur in about four months
from the time of the original cuts. Time would prove the
guess to be close but only after the fiscal year was over
(Mette, 1990). The monthly drop could not be predicted by the
readiness system as currently configured. A readiness
measurement system should focus on important issues, tie
performance measures to resources, and not pay more attention
to qualifications than is warranted (Anthony and Herzlinger,
1980, pp. 243-245).
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The motivation for this thesis hinges upon the
researchers' belief that the current readiness system may be
lacking as a management control system. Although any
measurement system is better than none at all, MOEs must be
constantly reviewed in order for them to maintain ap-
plicability to the real world. This thesis will both review
the current MOEs for their relevance in today's VP Navy and
attempt to identify others that may be more significant.
C. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The authors understand that the VP readiness system has
remained relatively unchanged for two decades. The reason for
this has, perhaps, been more because of the enormity of the
research effort required to support the change than the lack
of a need for one. As more and more requirements are levied
on squadron CO's, something must give. True readiness may
suffer because of this. As CO's attempt to maximize "paper
readiness," resources are expended that may be used more
effectively in other areas if paper readiness does not
accurately reflect true readiness.
The goal of this study is to conduct a thorough analytical
study of the VP readiness and budgeting systems. The results
from this study should help determine if additional factors
can be incorporated or excess factors can be removed from the
present system, enabling it to become a more viable control
system and decision making tool.
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The thesis seeks to develop a system that allows in-
dividual crews to concentrate on training without being overly
concerned with test results. If the system measures the
proper factors, the squadron Commanding Officer will have a
better system to facilitate management of his resources. The
Wing Commanders will be able to better allocate limited
resources to squadrons with the greatest need, results will
show actual usage, and adjustments can be made to maximize
true readiness. When budget cuts are necessary the Wing
Commander can more accurately predict the resulting decrease
in readiness.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The study initially used readily available aggregate
budget and readiness data maintained by CPWP. Failing to
obtain satisfactory results, it then developed criteria to
identify effective crews and less effective crews from Moffett
Field VP squadrons over the past six months. With these crews
identified, it explores quantifiable factors involving their
training experience from September 1989 to January 1990 which
can be used to validate or invalidate the current readiness
system.
The factors obtained for the study are limited to records
maintained within the squadron training records, flight logs,
readiness records and personnel records. These factors
include flight hours per month, Weapon System Trainer hours
13
per month, average days between crew evolutions, experience
level per crew, flight school grades, etc. Crew analysis was
limited to the Patrol Plane Commander, Tactical Coordinator,
and Acoustic Sensor Operator 1. While some factors could be
substantiated by other sources, the researchers were forced to
accept squadron records as being reliable.
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
While analyzing the present VP readiness system for its
ability both to predict crew operational performance and to
motivate VP community managers to employ assets in the most
beneficial way, certain questions must be answered:
• What are the distinguishing characteristics of
"effective" and "less effective" crews?
* How are these characteristics measured under the present
readiness system?
" What training characteristics distinguish "effective" VP
crews from "less effective" VP crews?
" Can these training characteristics be expressed in terms
of measurable resource expenditures?
* How well does the. current readiness system predict the ASW
performance of a crew ?
" How does the current system allocate resources to improve
performance?
• Does the current system match resource usage to areas
where maximum improvement in readiness can be achieved?
" Can changes be made to the current system to improve its
ability to perform as a management control system?
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F. ORGANIZATION
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter I
gives a background of the issues involved and provides the
reader with a sense of the motivation that went into the
pursuit of this topic.
Chapter II gives the reader a feel for previous studies
on this subject, as well as related works regarding
measurement methods. General training criteria are discussed
and the applicability to incorporating this into the current
readiness system is evaluated.
Chapter III provides insight into current theories on
training elements can be applied to the VP readiness system.
The elements of training which are pertinent here concern the
initial acquisition of skills, the maintenance and refinement
of these skills, and finally the evaluation of the
effectiveness of the training program.
Chapter IV describes the VP organization. The different
crew members within a VP squadron are delineated explaining
the various duties of each. The chapter discusses the
training program for specific crew members. It then presents
the operational chain of command from the President to the VP
squadron. This sets the framework for understanding the
current readiness system.
Chapter V outlines the fiscal chain of command for the
Maritime Patrol Aviation community. It describes the process
by which funding reaches the individual VP squadrons and how
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CO's are motivated to maintain their funding levels. Finally,
a discussion of some of the impacts of funding shortfalls on
VP readiness is presented.
Chapter VI spells out the military readiness system in
general and how the VP readiness system fits into it. It
discusses the system in general terms so that this thesis can
be unclassified and be disseminated to the widest possible
audience.
Chapter VII discusses the methodology that was developed
to examine the current VP readiness system. A description of
some of the problems that were encountered in looking at the
system is provided. The chapter attempts to validate the
methodology chosen through some analytical reasoning. It
presents the data that were collected and why those data were
chosen over other data. Analyzes are done on the data which
point out significant findings. It looks to the results with
an eye towards improving upon the current VP readiness system
and enabling VP CO's to utilize their resources in areas which
provide the most potential for on-station performance success.
Finally, Chapter VIII provides the VP community with some
recommendations for improvement of the current readiness
system. It provides some conclusions on the entire readiness
system and comments on the prospects for making changes in the
overall system. The chapter presents conclusions, recom-
mendations, and suggestions for further research so that what
was gained in this effort can be expanded upon in the future.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In analyzing the current VP readiness system, the authors
did an extensive literature review. The examination was done
in two stages. First, utilizing sources gleaned from the
Naval Postgraduate School's Semi-Automatic Bibliographic
Retrieval System, the Defense RDT&E On-Line System, and the
Defense Technical Information Center databases, a solid
background in military readiness was obtained which was
required to base an investigative framework. The second stage
of the review was targeted at the learning and training
process and how the understanding of this process could play
a part in the thesis.
A. READINESS LITERATURE AND VP LITERATURE
Melvin Laird's special analysis entitled The Problem of
Military Readiness (1980) provided the writers of this thesis
with a historical perspective in which to view current
military readiness systems. This analysis, together with the
book Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations by Robert
Anthony and Regina Herzlinger (1980), proved very useful in
developing measures to validate and improve the current VP
readiness system as a means to allocate limited resources
prudently.
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Thomas A. Musson conducted a study for the Air War College
in 1978 which was used by the authors of this thesis in
conceptually understanding past readiness measurement systems
as management control systems. The Musson study points out
that
The linking of resource allocation and readiness
measurement, while obvious on the surface, could cause a
whole new series of problems. Any effort to provide the
link between readiness and resources must include a
careful study of the interrelationship(s) ... that are
being addressed. (Musson, 1978, p. 38)
It suggests several areas where tradeoffs play a part in the
decision making process to maximize readiness within available
resources.
In June 1980, the Training Analysis and Evaluation Group
conducted an examination of the operational performance of P-3
pilots as a function of readiness training. This study proved
to be an excellent source in developing MOEs to measure crew
effectiveness. Several of this study's MOEs, including Naval
Air Training and Operations Procedures Standardization
(NATOPS) tests scores and months to designation, were incor-
porated into this thesis. The study served to validate the
need to track simulator utilization by crews. It concluded,
most importantly, that "no adverse effects on operational
performance occurred when the simulator was effectively
employed in conjunction with reduced aircraft training."
(McDaniel, 1980, p.15) It also added credence to several
18
findings from this thesis with regard to tracking certain crew
parameters.
Several recent studies on very focused aspects of the VP
readiness and training system were useful in enabling the
authors to do directed searches for answers to the specific
research questions. The first study by William Blake,
entitled Fiscal Constraints and the P-3 Flight Hour Budget,
(1988) was of tremendous benefit in understanding the effects
of budget constraints on P-3 flight hours. It was a natural
progression to use this study as a springboard to further tie
the budget to readiness. The Blake study was very thorough as
a background to this thesis and will be referred to quite
frequently.
Another study conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses
provides a research memorandum entitled The Use of Flight
Simulators in Measuring and Improving Training Effectiveness
(1986) provides insight into the extent to which military
performance is explained by personal characteristics. The
analysis develops a model to measure experience level, and
education level of a VP aircrew. It then uses these
measurements to explain performance levels of reserve and
active duty aircrew. The study concludes that reserves
perform just as well as active duty aircrew and experience
little skill loss over time. This conclusion provides a basis
for developing the model used in this thesis. With skill loss
being a critical element in any training program, determining
19
this loss so resources can be expended to counteract it is
crucial to any readiness system. The study also pointed out
aircrew interaction as an area for further research. This
thesis attempts to look at aircrew interaction as an
explanation for performance variation.
The last recent study dealing with readiness measurement
and personnel characteristics was of limited use to this
thesis. This thesis dealt with maintenance readiness but
pointed out some areas to watch carefully when studying
readiness. It points out that any research into a readiness
system must take into account the possibility of "gaming" the
results. Gaming is the ability to manipulate the measurements
so they will produce a more complimentary figure (Maxfield,
1985, p. 32). The authors of this thesis tried to ensure that
data was not gamed and biased by those in position to do so.
Finally, the Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center did a readiness assessment study in 1986 for the Air
Reconnaissance (VQ) squadrons entitled Development of a
Computer-Managed Readiness Assessment System. It discusses
the development of an instantaneous readiness assessment
system for the VQ community. Many of the conclusions are
universal in nature and could easily be transferred to the VP
community. The research provides support to several of this
thesis' conclusions and recommendations.
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B. TRAINING SPECIFIC LITERATURE
The peace time military is constantly training. The
readiness system should measure this training and provide
feedback to management as to where additional resources are
required. Before it is possible to evaluate a management
control system, which is based in large degree on skill
retention, it is essential to understand the nature of
training and how to achieve the highest level of performance
from each member or crew. Therefore, the second part of the
review of academic literature concentrated on issues concer-
ning learning (training), motivation, and evaluation. This
section provides a synopsis of literature used in writing this
thesis. Chapter III expands on the learning theories gathered
from these sources and applies them to training in the VP
community.
The first text reviewed was the Taxonomy of Educational
Objectives, edited by Benjamin Bloom (1956). It lays the
ground work for understanding the learning process.
Especially important to this thesis are Bloom's views
concerning evaluation and will be a basis for some of this
thesis' recommendations.
Henry Ellis' The Transfer of Learning (1965) provides
insight into how learning can be transferred from one task to
another. He discusses the amount of practice required to
learn a skill, expressing the need for a great deal of
practice in the beginning stage of skill development and less
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frequent after the skill is learned. This information should
be taken into account when developing any training system.
As the title implies, Theories of Learning by Hilgard and
Bower (1975) presents several current studies and theories
that apply to learning. Two of these studies are extremely
appropriate to this thesis. The first concerns the timing of
practice to maximize skill retention. The second deals with
motivation as it relates to performance. It concludes,
essentially, that motives are the psychological factors which
convert knowledge into action.
Learning and Motivation by Frank Logan (1970) is an
introduction to motivation as it applies to learning
situations. This work differentiates between learning and
performance. It is Logan's theory that learning takes place
without external incentives being present. However, motiva-
tion is required to get the best performance from this
learning. In addition, Logan discusses at what pace practice
should be conducted. Both concepts are appropriate and
utilized by this thesis.
Educational Psychology by Louis Smith and Bryce Hudgins
(1964) draws upon some of the most important research and
theory available in the area of educational psychology
including the work of B.F. Skinner, George Homans, and David
McClelland. Smith and Hudgins present basic concepts of
educational psychology, such as measurement, behavior,
personality, theory of learning, and the development of
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intellectual skills and abilities. This thesis will touch on
their studies dealing with optimum timing between practice
events.
The final review is of the national bestseller In Search
of Excellence by Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman
(1982). This well documented book puts theory into practice
and gives insight into what management techniques work best.
The researchers profited from chapters dealing with positive
reinforcement and intrinsic motivation. Both are essential
elements in a viable management control system.
The literature searches were unable to locate specific
studies or research done on the entire VP readiness system.
The searches, together with our interviews with current
leadership within the VP community, underscored the need for
such a comprehensive look at the system. While studies have
been done on particular aspects of the system, no recent
studies have looked at the composite system. This thesis, in
attempting to look at the entire VP readiness system, while
keeping it relevant to individual squadron commanding officers
within the system, has done something never attempted before
in the VP community.
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III. TRAINING ELEMENTS
An essential ingredient of readiness is training.
Elements of training which are pertinent here are the initial
acquisition of cognitive and development of psycho-motor
skills. Following this are the maintenance and refinement of
these skills. The readiness system is designed to evaluate
the quality of the performance of each aircrew and, thus,
reflects upon the effectiveness of the training program. A
grading system provides the trainees with an evaluation of
their performance and outlines for them what is necessary to
achieve the required level of performance. The following
sections provide insight as to how theories on training and
evaluation can be applied to the VP readiness system.
A. TRAINING
According to Bloom there are six stages of learning which
can be easily applied to any training situation. These are
knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis,
and evaluation. Each stage is thought to build upon the
previous stage. Bloom defines knowledge as "behaviors and
test situations which emphasize the remembering, either by
recognition or recall, of ideas, material, or phenomena."
(Bloom, 1956, p. 18) In comprehension the emphasis is on
understanding the meaning and intent of the material. The
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emphasis in application concerns remembering and bringing to
bear upon given material the appropriate generalizations or
principles. Analysis emphasizes the breakdown of the material
into its component parts and recognizing the relationship and
organization of the parts. Synthesis generally involves a
combining previous experience with new material creating a new
integrated whole. Finally, Bloom defines evaluation as an
individuals emphasis on appraisal of internal or external
evidence concerning himself. (Bloom, 1956, p. 18) The
emphasis of this thesis, however, concerns evaluation of an
individuals performance by others.
The first two stages are completed while VP students are
in preliminary training, prior to coming to a squadron and
becoming members of a particular crew, and are beyond the
scope of this study. Of the remaining four, this thesis will
concentrate on application and evaluation.
At the squadron level "the training really begins." The
new crew member is integrated with more experienced members
who already have acquired "readiness." Learning from
experienced crew members is appropriate and efficient.
However, the new member needs immediate reinforcement
(application) of his new-found knowledge. "The decay theory
of forgetting simply states that memory, like all biological
processes, deteriorates as time passes." (Hoffman, Vernoy,
and Williams, 1987, p. 261) If the other crew members are
highly experienced and fully qualified, the new member is
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likely to get less practice because the readiness system may
say the crew is qualified and no further training is required
at this time. The new member's skills are highly perishable
and valuable learning may be lost or delayed. Ellis provides
us with an important insight into this aspect of learning or
transference of knowledge.
...extensive practice on the original task increases the
likelihood of positive transfer to a subsequent task,
whereas more limited practice may yield no transfer or
even negative transfer. Harlow implies that very thorough
practice should be given in the early stage of developing
new skills and concepts. Later on, such thoroughness may
not be required. (Ellis, 1965, p.71)
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is considered a perishable
skill (Smith, 1990). That is, all crew members require skill
reinforcement if improvement or skill maintenance is to be
expected (Hilgard and Bower, 1975, p.201). Additionally,
... in one skill-retention study for Device 14A2 Surface
ASW Attack Trainer, skills were evaluated in the training
device at periods from 8 to 16 weeks after initial device
training was completed. The results showed that the
students rapidly forgot what they learned, indicating the
need for frequent refresher training. (Micheli, 1972, p.
140)
There is a tendency in the readiness system to group
training. This means a crew trains to achieve a set of ASW
standards (or qualifications) in a short period of time. Then
there is a long period of limited ASW training, while the next
crew is achieving its qualifications. This occurs repeatedly
until the set of qualifications have expired. The sequence is
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then repeated. However, a number of studies have indicated
that training time is better spent when the periods are broken
up and distributed over time.
Whether you learn verbal materials...or motor skills such
as typing, you are better off spacing your learning
periods, with rest periods between practice sessions.
Psychologists call this learning strategy distributed
practice. (Hoffman, Vernoy, and Williams, 1987, p. 246)
Davidoff reports that "distributed practice is particularly
effective for learning motor skills..." (Davidoff, 1987, p.
209) The Ellis and Davidoff studies do not set guidelines for
intervals between events but, rather, suggest a general
principle. Schedule practice periods between the extremes of
too often (overcrowding) and too seldom (forgetting). Harmon
and Miller (1957) found an optimal arrangement which they
called "additive time patterns." Essentially, they suggested
to crowd practice initially, in our case, for junior crews or
junior crew members, and then provide a greater distribution
of practice when the basics have been fully achieved and each
additional step can build upon the next. (Smith and Hudgins,
1964, pp. 457-458)
The way one trains is also important. As previously
thought, practice does not make perfect, but rather depends
upon what is practiced. For example, extensive practice at a
slow pace may interfere with later learning to respond
quickly. (Logan, 1972, p. 199) This is especially important
in ASW, which often requires a rapid response.
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B. MOTIVATION
A properly developed readiness system should provide
incentives to improve performance. Motivation relates to
performance. Motives or drives are considered to be those
psychological factors which are responsible for converting
knowledge into action. (Hilgard and Bower, p. 21)
Logan's studies have shown that learning actually takes
place at about the same rate whether or not rewards are
present (Logan, 1972, p. 199). The difference is that the
results of the group without the rewards may be latent and not
demonstrated until some reward is available. This is true as
long as the motivational level is normal. If this level
falls, then reduced motivation will affect learning and, in
turn, influence the transfer of learning. If a student is
poorly motivated, he will tend to learn less and thus reduce
the chance of transfer to new learning situations.
The VP community and the military in general are made up
of members that are intrinsically motivated. They would not
be there unless they wanted to be. They consider themselves
professionals and are committed to do well. Due to standards
for admission, all are capable of a high level of performance.
Therefore, the system should take advantage of this motivation




Evaluation is an important part of learning and
performance. Evaluation should provide appropriate feedback
so that what is learned is what should be learned. Evaluation
establishes how well one achieves learning objectives.
Objectives not only provide the learner with what he must do
but also provides the basis upon which the evaluation is made.
The achievement of objectives provides motivation for
improving performance.
Evaluation can also be a source of anxiety for many crew
members. According to Spence (1964), anxiety is viewed as a
motivational variable that increases the probability of
various responses being made in a learning situation that
involves relatively simple types of learning. However,
anxiety tends to interfere with performance in more complex
learning tasks. (Ellis, 1965, p. 65) ASW is viewed as a
complex learning task, since crew members are expected to
perform several functions at the same time; they must maintain
constant accurate communication with crew members, manipulate
complicated electronic equipment, and interpret data which
enable them to make appropriate decisions. Crew members
afraid of failure will suffer a reduction in learning. (Logan,
1979, p. 34)
The VP community may evaluate its crews excessively. This
is probably not unexpected for, as Bloom states,
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Man is apparently so constituted that he cannot refrain
from evaluating, judging, appraising, or valuing almost
everything which comes within his purview.... It is quite
possible that the evaluative process will in some cases be
the groundwork for the acquisition of new knowledge, a new
attempt at comprehension or application, or a new analysis
and synthesis. (Bloom, 1956, p. 185)
However, because of the simplicity of testing specific
knowledge, evaluation is frequently emphasized out of
proportion to its usefulness or its relevance to the
situation. A problem occurs when excessive evaluation ceases
to be a positive motivating factor and causes a decrease in
learning. The motivation then changes to just meeting grading
criteria and away from learning (Bloom, 1956, p. 34).
The concepts discussed in this chapter are used as a basis
for evaluating the current VP training and readiness system.
Findings from statistical tests presented in Chapter VII of




To grasp the meaning of terms presented in later chapters
and to gain an appreciation for the resources expended by the
VP community in order to maintain readiness, one should have
an understanding of its purpose and organization. The
overall responsibility of the VP community is to keep the sea
lanes open. From this responsibility two major VP missions
have emerged; anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surveillance.
The ASW mission has traditionally been given the highest
priority.
The typical ASW mission involves a one hour aircrew
intelligence and mission brief followed by a three hour
preflight check of aircraft systems. A crew normally flies
one to four hours to the mission area (on-station) before
beginning its assigned task. This ASW mission involves the
dropping of sonobuoys in the water at different depths to
acoustically acquire and track submarines. The mission
usually culminates with a simulated weapon drop on the
submarine. Once the mission is completed the crew returns
home, postflights the aircraft, and debriefs the mission at
the Wing and obtains a graded evaluation or on-station
effectiveness (OSE).
Recent events have emphasized the VP surveillance mission
with its drug interdiction capacity. However, since ASW is
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the dominant VP mission, the skills involve in the mission are
perishable, and the readiness system stresses ASW, this thesis
views the readiness system from an ASW perspective.
This chapter describes the various crew members who
comprise a VP aircrew and the role each individual plays in
the VP ASW mission. It then describes the training invested
in three particular crew members on whom this thesis
concentrates much of its attention. Finally, the chapter
reveals how the entire organization fits into the overall
defense structure.
A. VP CREW MEMBERS
A crew of twelve officers and enlisted men typically fly
an ASW mission in the Lockheed P-3C Orion aircraft. This
standard crew consists of five officers (three pilots, a
tactical coordinator (TACCO), and a navigator/communicator
(NAV/COMM)) and seven enlisted men (two f'ight engineers
(FEs), two acoustic operators (sensor station 1 and 2 (SSl &
SS2)), a non-acoustic operator (sensor station 3 (SS3)), an
ordnanceman, and an in-flight technician (IFT). Each crew
member performs a unique task for the overall VP mission. The
following section gives a brief description of each position
on the "standard" P-3C aircrew. Seniority and experience
levels of actual crews may differ from those described;
however, those differences are the exception and not the rule.
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The senior most qualified member of the crew is designated
as the mission commander. The mission commander (usually the
senior of the crew TACCO or Patrol Plane Commander (PPC) is
responsible for the overall mission success. His decisions
are final when any differences arise regarding tactical
employment of the aircraft.
Although only two pilots can actually have physical
control of the aircraft at any one time, three pilots are
attached to the standard aircrew. This assignment is for
safety reasons; flying with an additional pilot enables the
aircraft to be flown to its maximum endurance limits. The
PPC is the most experienced pilot on the crew and as such is
responsible for the physical aircraft. He is in charge of the
safe operation of the aircraft during the entire assigned
mission. The second pilot (2P) and third pilot (3P) are
junior to the PPC and have less experience, knowledge and
qualifications than the PPC. The 3P and 2P are at various
stages in the pilot training syllabus and are working towards
the ultimate goal of being designated a PPC.
Two FEs fly with the standard crew, even though only one
can physically perform his duty at a time, for the same safety
reasons as with the pilots. The FE is the primary assistant
to the pilots in ensuring flight safety. By performing main-
tenance on various flight systems when not flying, the FE is
an expert on these systems of the P-3. He sits between the
two pilots and assists them as necessary in monitoring and
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manipulating various components of the aircraft's controls.
Normally one flight engineer is fully qualified to perform his
duties and the other is in the FE training syllabus.
The senior of the two Naval Flight Officers (NFOs) on the
crew is the TACCO. The TACCO is responsible for implementing
appropriate strategy and procedures and utilizing sonobuoy and
weapon loads as the tactical situation dictates. He runs the
tactical problem from his station and directs the activities
of all other crew members to ensure effective employment of
the crew and aircraft, given mission constraints.
The NAV/COMM is the junior NFO on the crew and is
responsible to navigate the aircraft to and from an
operational area, to transmit reports in accordance with
directives and to assist the TACCO as necessary. He is
responsible for maintaining an accurate log of geographical
positions and important events so that the mission can be
reconstructed during post flight analysis. His objective in
the squadron training syllabus is to be designated a TACCO.
The two acoustic system operators, SSI and SS2, are
responsible to detect and to classify acoustic contact data
that is presented to them on their sensitive listening gear.
They are to become familiar with the ASW environment which
presents itself on a particular mission so that the TACCO can
employ effective tactics. The SSl and SS2 stations on the
aircraft are basically similar. The SSl is fully qualified to
perform his responsibilities, while the SS2 is in the process
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of training to be a designated SSl. For the most part,
experience in the aircraft is all that distinguishes a SSl
from a SS2. No new systems must be learned in the transition
from SSl to SS2, as is necessary in the transition from
NAV/COMM to TACCO.
The only non-acoustic operator on the aircraft, the SS3,
is responsible for all the aircraft tactical systems which do
not directly involve acoustic information. His duties involve
the use of the radar, electronic support measures (ESM) and
magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear. He utilizes the
systems available to him as the TACCO directs.
The ordnanceman is responsible for loading search stores,
such as sonobuoys, and kill stores, such as torpedoes, as
directed by the TACCO. He must coordinate all the logistics
required for those loads. Depending on squadron policy, he
normally acts as photographer for the crew when mission
objectives require.
The IFT normally repairs all the aircraft avionics when
not flying and is experienced in troubleshooting techniques.
He aids in preflight checks of all major aircraft systems and
is responsible for ensuring that the checks are acceptable
prior to takeoff. Once in-flight, he uses his system
knowledge to ensure all aircraft avionics perform without flaw
when required.
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B. CRITICAL CREW MMEBER TRAINING
Since ASW was determined to have the greatest requirement
for resource usage in the VP community, the authors
concentrated the analysis on those crew members who have the
most responsibility in performing this mission. The crew
members which were selected were the TACCO, PPC, and SS1.
These three crew members were determined to have the greatest
impact on overall crew performance in the ASW mission. All
other crew members support these three on this mission.
While the VP readiness system recognizes the SS3 as a
"critical" crew member, the authors' analysis of Fiscal Year
89 flight data indicated that the SS3 did not play a
significant role in performing the assigned mission in more
than 4 percent of the operational flights. For this reason he
was deleted from further analysis. The thesis analyzed the
characteristics of the three critical crew members for
specific measurable factors which might explain crew
performance disparities. The following section provides a
comprehensive background of the training of these crew
members.
The PPC is a commissioned officer who has physically met
the Navy requirements to become a pilot. Following
commissioning he travels to Pensacola, Florida and attends a
six week aviation indoctrination (AI) course. This course
involves physical testing and water skills testing, as well as
basic aeronautics and basic engineering ground school. After
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completing AI, the pilot attends basic flight school for 20
weeks. Here he develops his flying skills in the T-34C
aircraft. The grades he earns in this course play a
significant role in determining his eligibility to fly jets,
propeller aircraft or helicopters. If he is selected for
propeller training he is assigned to the advanced propeller
training course in Corpus Christi, Texas. Completing this
course earns him the coveted Navy "wings of gold." Upon
pinning on his wings, he is sent to a Fleet Replacement
Squadron (FRS) for approximately 22 weeks of training in the
P-3 model he will subsequently fly. VP-31 in Moffett Field,
California and VP-30 in Jacksonville, Florida are the P-3 FRSs
for the west and east coast VP squadrons, respectively.
Completion of the FRS training syllabus certifies the
pilot is ready to join the fleet. The pilot is assigned to
his first squadron in any of four locations, Moffett Field,
California; Barbers Point, Hawaii; Brunswick, Maine; or
Jacksonville, Florida. Once assigned to the squadron, he is
expected to qualify within twelve months of squadron check-in
as a 3P, within 18 months as a 2P and within 24 months as a
PPC. Mission commander designation is usually acquired after
six months of being assigned as a crew's PPC.
The TACCO is a commissioned officer who has physically met
the Navy requirement to become a pilot, with the exception of
visual acuity. An NFO's eyes are not limited to uncorrected
20/20 vision, as for a pilot; his vision may be correctable to
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20/20 with glasses. After commissioning, he attends the same
AI course with the pilots. From this course he is assigned to
Training Squadron 10 (VT-10), where he spends approximately 16
weeks learning basic flying skills. The course culminates in
five flights navigating and performing all the communications
for the T-2C aircraft and plays a major role in his
eligibility for the different NFO career paths (fighter,
attack, patrol etc.) If he is chosen for the patrol
community career path, he attends a 20 week multi-service
navigation school to gain skills in long distance navigation
in the Air Force T-43A aircraft. After graduation from
navigation school he earns his "wings of gold" and is sent for
approximately 22 weeks to one of the two FRSs with the pilots.
Here he begins to learn tactics and P-3C aircraft systems
which will be used on the various missions he will be required
to fly. After completion of the FRS, he obtains orders to one
of the previously described VP loc&cions. The NFO goes
through each squadron's training syllabus and qualifies as a
NAV/COMM in about 12 months and as a TACCO in another 12
months. He typically is designated as mission commander six
months after being assigned the TACCO for a crew.
Enlisted men in the anti-submarine warfare (AW) rating
fill the SSl and SS2 positions on a VP crew. To be qualified
for this rating the enlisted recruit must meet some relatively
stringent requirements, including an armed services aptitude
battery test (ASVAB) multiple of 200. This ASVAB multiple is
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very high relative to other ratings (Gonzalez, 1986, p32).
After graduating from the seven week initial training course
all Navy recruits attend, the recruit is sent to Aircrew
Candidate School (ACS) for five weeks in Pensacola, Florida.
Here the recruit learns about general aviation, safety
procedures and swimming. Upon completion of ACS the
aircrewman is sent to AW "A" School for eleven weeks of
classroom instruction in sonar principles, sound physics, and
acoustic analysis. From "A" school the newly designated AW
is assigned to Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training
Group (FASO) collocated with the FRSs in Moffett Field and
Jacksonville. FASO introduces the AW to the equipment he will
be using on the P-3C aircraft. He begins to apply principles
he has mastered to real world scenarios. Upon completion of
FASO training the AW is assigned to the FRS and begins to fly
on the P-3C aircraft with the other crewmen. Here all his
previous training comes together. FRS completion enables the
AW to be assigned to his squadron. The AW normally qualifies
as a SS2 in twelve months and as a SSl in an additional twelve
months.
C. VP OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND
Currently, squadrons are manned to support 12 aircrews and
nine P-3 aircraft. As this thesis is written, however, the
squadrons are being reduced as a result of budget cuts. There
are currently 24 active duty VP squadrons in the Navy, with
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approximately 300 officers and enlisted men attached to each.
Twelve of the squadrons are on the east cost, seven in
California, and five in Hawaii.
Two different chains of command dictate how and what
missions will be performed by VP squadrons. The operational
chain of command for Moffett Field squadrons is shown in
Figure 2. The administrative chain of command is described in
the next chapter. As can be seen in the figure, the chain of
command is straight forward. Of note is the fact that Moffett
Field squadrons which are not deployed report directly to the
Wing Commander. When a squadron is deployed to the seventh
fleet's area of responsibility (including much of the western










Commander I Commander 1
ASW Forces Seventh Fleet
Commander Commander
Task Force 12 Task Force 72
(ASW Forces) (ASW Forces)
Commander
Wing 10
VP Squadrons VP Squadrons
Moffett Field (Deployed)
(At Home)
Figure 2. VP Operational Chain of Command
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V. THE BUDGETARY PROCESS FOR VP SQUADRONS
This chapter is devoted to explaining the VP fiscal
requirements and administrative chain of command for the
Maritime Patrol Aviation community. It details the process by
which VP funding is obtained and, in particular, how flight
and Weapon System Trainer hour funding budgets are developed.
It describes how the funds are distributed down the chain of
command and finally what happens when the funds reach the
individual VP squadrons.
Squadron commanding officers receive in excess of $2
million a year to operate their squadrons. This involves
everything from flying their aircraft to buying pencils.
Before the Congress appropriates funds, those who use the
funds must provide budget figures. This process, called
budget formulation, is practiced at all levels in DOD.
Approximately 95% of operational aviation squadron funding
involves flight hours and revolves around a concept called
Primary Mission Readiness or PMR. The following section
describes this concept and its use in DOD budget formulation.
A. PRIMARY MISSION READINESS (PHR)
The basis for programming of flight hours for VP as well
as other aviation communities has, for several years, been
defined by Primary Mission Readiness. PMR is derived from a
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compilation of the average number of flight hours required for
each crew per month to insure adequate performance in each
assigned Primary Mission area. A Primary Mission is an area
of specialization in which an operational unit (VP squadron)
is required to maintain combat readiness. The Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) assigns Primary Mission areas to all naval
units. ASW is the most important Primary Mission area
assigned to the VP community (CPWP Flying Hour Program, 1984,
pp. II-i and 11-2) and the area that requires the greatest
concentration of training effort to remain combat ready.
Training programs and standards have been established to
ensure the fulfillment Lf these requirements.
The first step in understanding PMR is understanding how
VP functions. Essentially, VP squadrons are in one of three
phases at all times -- deployed, ready/alert (R/A), or
training. These phases make up an 18-month cycle, with six
months deployed and twelve months at home divided between
training and R/A phases.
Deployment, as mentioned earlier, refers to the squadron
actually leaving its bome base for an extended period of
approximately six months. When required, the deployed
squadron is directed to conduct any of its assigned Primary
Missions in an operational environment. The ready/alert phase
is similar to deployment in that a squadron will be assigned
operational flights but remains at its home base to perform
these missions. This phase lasts one month at a time and
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normally occurs three times during the typical twelve month
at-home period. Training is conducted in each phase when
operational flights are not required. Any time the squadron
is at home and not in the R/A phase it is in the training
phase.
In 1976, Commander Patrol Wings Pacific (CPWP) sponsored
a PMR study which quantified the flight hour requirements for
each phase. It specified the amount of training that can be
derived from every hour of an operational flight as well as a
dedicated training flight. The training hours it prescribes
are supported by an extremely detailed breakdown of squadron
training needs. From this study an overall PMR value for VP
crews was established. The phase a squadron is in determines
what percentage of the PMR value that its crews will be
budgeted for. This study was later revised in 1984 to include
the flight hour reduction benefits derived from simulator
usage. The study, entitled CPWP Flying Hour Program, remains
the cornerstone of VP flight hour budget formulation (CPWP
Flying Hour Program, 1984).
Flight and aircrew simulators provide a highly cost-
effective substitution for inflight training. As aircraft
operating and maintenance costs continue to increase, maximum
utilization of simulators assumes critical importance.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine this important training




Basically, CPWP controls two types of simulators, a flight
simulator for pilot training and a Weapon Systems Trainer for
aircrew ASW training. Although the trainers are expensive to
purchase (currently $30-40 millon per unit, about the price of
one P-3 aircraft), they are extremely cheap to operate and
maintain. At an average cost of $29 per hour to operate a
trainer, they are definitely a bargain when compared to the
$1250 per hour cost of flying a P-3 (Jerry, 1990).
At first glance, trading simulator time for flying hours
appears to be an answer to reduced budgets. But, on close
inspection, one finds that simulator shortcomings cloud this
picture. A major problem of simulator substitution is that,
as exposure to the device increases, pilots will improve at a
decreasing rate. This implies the pilot initially gains
meaningful training at a very rapid rate. As the training
device is pushed to its limits of simulation, transfer of
real-world flight experience slows until the aircraft must be
used to gain the needed realism. While the simulator does
offer trade-offs in piloting skills, it does not provide a
one-to-one substitution for aircraft flight hours (CPWP Flying
Hour Program, 1984). This finding is in concert with Ellis
(1965) and his studies on the transference of learning.
In addition to operational flight simulators, the Weapon
System Trainer supports P-3 aircrew training requirements.
This simulator reproduces the P-3 aircraft aft of the cockpit.
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The ability to "freeze" the trainer when crew coordination
problems are detected make this device an invaluable
complement to actual ASW training flights. Aircrew tactical
simulator utilization consists of qualification exercises,
crew coordination, aircrew positional upgrade training (e.g.,
to advance from SS2 to SSl), predeployment training, and pre-
exercise training.
Although the WST is an excellent training device, there
simply are not enough properly configured tactical trainers
available to fully support fleet demand. For example, a
single WST (P-3 UIII model) supports the Fleet Replacement
Squadron (rR3), five squadrons , and a reserve squadron.
Therefore, squadrons can not take full advantage and often
require additional flight hours to meet ASW training
requirements (CPWP Flying Hour Program, 1984). With today's
tight budgets, these additional flight hours may not always be
available.
With all the above factors taken into account, the CPWP
study found that the two types of simulators reduce monthly
PMR requirements. The flight simulator time is substituted
for three hours of PMR and the WST simulator is substituted
for an additional six hours. Thus, overall flight hour
requirements are reduced by nine hours per crew per month.
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C. BUDGET DERIVATION FROM PMR
The following are the basic formulas for determining
annual flight hours and the budget required to fund these
hours:
Annual Flight Hours = PMR X (11 crews/squadron)
X (12 squadrons) X (12 months)
Annual Funding = Annual Flight Hours X Cost per Flight Hour
The cost per hour is determined by the DOD contracted fuel
price for the year multiplied by the historical average of
gallons per flight hour used by each model of the P-3 aircraft
(Blake, 1988, p. 14). Historical maintenance and average
specific equipment repair costs are then added to this figure
to give the total cost per flight hour. The annual funding is
then derived from the annual flight hour requirement
multiplied by the total cost per flight hour.
Given on the annual funding figure for all VP squadrons,
Commander, Naval Air Pacific (CNAP), the Operating Budget
Holder, combines this figure with all other aviation units
under its command and submits this as part of its budget up
the chain of command.
D. APPROPRIATION AND ALLOCATION
The Appropriation Act is enacted by Congress and signed by
the President. The Treasury department then issues
Appropriation Warrants to the General Accounting Office (GAO)
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for countersignature to guarantee agreement between the
executive and legislative branches prior to execution.
Warrants specify the amount for a particular appropriation and
any restrictions placed on the account by Congress. The
countersigned warrants make the appropriated funds available
for apportionment by the office of Management and Budget
(OMB).
Funds are apportioned by OMB to the Department of Defense,
which in turn apportions funds to the Department of the Navy.
These funds are generally apportioned without subdivisions for
programs or projects. O&M,N funds are annual appropriations
but are apportioned on a quarterly basis.
OMB apportions funds only at certain scheduled times
during the year in order to
• control the obligation and expenditure of funds over a
period of time;
" achieve the most effective and economical use of funds;
• guard as much as possible against deficiency or
supplemental appropriations;
" release only those funds required to meet the latest
plans; and
" prevent obligations and expenditures in excess of avail-
able amounts. (Practical Comptrollership, 1989, p. D-4)
Although these are strong justifications for quarterly
apportionment of funds, this procedure has serious
shortcomings for Navy management. Commands which ultimately
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receive these funds are forced to accept short term planning
as a way of life.
The apportioned funds go next to the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and the internal distribution of funds or
allocation process begins. Whereas the purpose of
apportionment is to control the rate at which funds are
obligated, the allocation process controls the total amount of
funds that are used for a particular budget activity during
the year. The CNO's comptroller (OP-82) reallocates O&M,N
funds to major claimants, who in turn issues allotments or
operating budgets to -field activities (Practical
Comptrollership, 1989, p.D-6). For the purpose of this
thesis, the major claimant for all squadron funding is
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and the
field activity is Commander, Naval Air Pacific (CNAP).
CNAP allocates funds or Operating Targets (OPTAR) to CPWP,
which in turn allocates them directly to the individual VP
squadrons. The OPTAR holder has an administrative limitation
rather than a legal limitation on spending. This does not mean
the Squadron CO can overspend his budgeted figure. To the
contrary, he is monitored very closely by both CPWP and CNAP
to insure that his OPTAR is not exceeded. Figure 3 on the
following page provides a schematic for the squadron funding
from beginning to end.
The major claimant for WST funding is Naval Air Systems
Command and the field activity is Contractor Operation and
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Maintenance of Simulators (COMS). Additional simulator
funding is provided by Naval Training Systems Center to CNAP
f or "premium hours." WST funding is simply a fixed amount
each year. A contract is let to operate and maintain each
trainer site. This is a fixed price contract and funded by
COMS. The contract price is the basis for the $29 per hour
per trainer operating and maintenance cost figure.
The common problem of needing additional training periods
when all regular periods are already committed is called surge
demand. This problem is solved with a lump sum of "premium
hour" funds provided by Naval Training System Center to CNAP
which, in turn, provides these funds to CPWP. They are used
for overtime training hours, especially weekend or extra night
periods. The surge demand may have been planned or due to
some unforeseen requirement. For whatever reason, funds are
available-but only for simulator training.
E. BUDGET EXECUTION
As mentioned earlier, quarterly distribution of flight
hour funds often causes a disruption in planning and
scheduling.
The allocation of O&M,N funds by operational commanders is
a continuous process because of the practice of quarterly
apportionment by OMB and also due to the uncertain
outcomes of the budgetary process. This lack of long-term
funding precludes meaningful long-range planning.
Planners are forced into a continuous "what if" scenario
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Figure 3. Flow of VP Squadron Funds
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CPWP's flying hour program allocation must optimize force
readiness as well as meet all operational commitments.
Working closely with each Wing Commander (although he is not
formally involved in budget allocation and execution), CPWP
allots an OPTAR to each squadron based on which phase each is
in. The highest amount is allotted to deployed squadrons, the
second highest to those in Ready Alert, and the least to those
in training. Since each quarter's funding level may be
different, CPWP, the Wing Commanders, and the squadron's find
it difficult to plan longer than one quarter.
After the initial quarterly distribution, flying hours and
funds are moved to appropriate squadrons to provide for
unforeseen operational contingencies. When this occurs,
flying hours may be taken away from scheduled training events,
since additional hours (surge protection) are unavailable.
This is in contrast to the availability of funds for WST
"premium hours." In discussions with senior Commanders, the
only explanation as to why a contingency fund does not exist
for flight hours is that fight hour funds are directed to be
reduced to zero. A contingency reserve implies that funds may
not be used if a contingency does not develop and, therefore,
is unacceptable due to the belief that the budget will be
reduced for the next period by the amount not used in the
current period.
In the past, the squadron commanding officer, who is the
end user of training resources, was not directly evaluated on
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the use of these assets. According to Blake (1988) and Bozin
(1981) this was a flaw in the management control system. Now,
with the focus on cutback management, the authors of this
thesis find that Wing Commanders do rate Commanding Officers
highly on their ability to manage available funds. However,
the Wing Commander, who is the primary evaluator of squadron
performance and signs the fitness reports for the squadron
commanding officers is not formally involved in the budget
process.
This chapter provided an understanding of how the budget
for VP squadron funds (flight and trainer hours) is developed
and how the allocated funds are distributed down the chain of
command. The discussion focused on the role PMR plays in
Budget preparation. Future chapters will evaluate the
readiness using this discussion as a baseline.
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VI. READINESS
The Department of Defense has continued to put a major
emphasis on the readiness of the armed forces. In preparing
for the fiscal year 1990/91 budget, then Secretary of Defense
Frank Carlucci stated that his budget priorities were in
"quality people and in readiness." (DOD Authorization and Ap-
propriations Hearings, 1990, p. 691) Vice Admiral Stanley R.
Arthur, in congressional hearings for the same budget, echoed
Secretary Carlucci's statement. However, he indicated that
readiness would not drive all resource expenditures.
We feel that we cannot continue to let the infra structure
deteriorate to protect direct readiness, because these
support elements are being degraded to the point that
overall readiness is being affected. Fleet readiness,
modernization, engineering and logistic support must
remain in balance as a matter of vital importance given
that our navy forces continue to be thrust in harms way
(DOD Authorization and Appropriations Hearings, 1990, p.
691).
In the recent past, the Navy shifted funds from
maintaining the infrastructure to support readiness. Admiral
Arthur indicates this shift can no longer be justified because
these infrastructure assets (e.g., hangers, runways, physical
plants) are deteriorating to such a degree that siphoning
additional funds into direct readiness without the supporting
these assets would degrade overall readiness. This means
that, if Navy's budget is going to be cut, as expected, Naval
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readiness will suffer in the same proportion as other funding
requirements. Thus, efficiency in spending readiness dollars
is paramount.
A. MILITARY READINESS SYSTEM
In order to have an understanding of readiness one must
comprehend four concepts, military readiness, combat
readiness, readiness areas, and readiness categories.
Military readiness, as previously discussed in Chapter I, is
having the proper mix of people and equipment to perform
effectively at the initiation of hostilities (Laird, 1980, p.
17). Combat readiness simply refers to whether a unit is cer-
tified ready for combat.
The overall military readiness rating of a unit depends
upon readiness measurements in four areas, personnel, equi-
pment, supplies on hand and training. These four areas are
derived from three of the military readiness definition's key
words: "people," "equipment," and "perform." "People" refers
to personnel readiness, "equipment" refers to both equipment
readiness and supplies-on-hand readiness and "perform" refers
to performance or, more precisely, training readiness.
Military Commanding Officers must continually measure how
ready their units are in terms of these four readiness areas
to derive their units' overall mission readiness.
Personnel readiness is a measure of whether or not a unit
has enough people to accomplish a mission. Equipment
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readiness involves measuring the military equipment's ability
to perform as designed. Supplies-on-hand readiness measures
whether or not a unit has enough equipment physically on hand.
Training readiness in essence is a measurement of the
personnel-equipment interface in getting the mission
accomplished. As Melvin Laird states, "(Training readiness)
is the most complex area of readiness to quantify." (Laird
1980, p. 19) This thesis concentrates on the training
readiness portion of the readiness system.
B. STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM
In 1980, DOD established the Unit Status and Identity
Reports (UNITREP) System. This system enabled all units
within DOD to report their readiness status in a standardized
format to higher authority. It remained relatively unchanged
until 1987, when the name was modified to Status of Resources
and Training System (SORTS). The reason for this change was
primarily to draw Congressional attention to the fact that the
readiness reporting system is a measurement of three resource
areas and one training area. Previously it had been thought
that the UNITREP provided only training readiness figures and
did not provide readiness measurements in the three other
areas.
SORTS places all units within DOD into one of five
readiness categories (C-ratings). These categories are:
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• C-1: Fully combat ready. Unit is fully capable of
performing the missions for which it was designed or
organized.
" C-2: Substantially combat ready. Unit is capable of
performing the mission for which it is organized or
designed, but has minor deficiencies which could reduce
its effectiveness or its ability to conduct sustained
operations.
" C-3: Marginally combat ready. Unit has major deficiencies
of such magnitude as to severely limit its capability to
perform the mission for which it is organized or designed,
but is capable of conducting limited operations for a
limited period.
" C-4: Not combat ready. Unit has so many deficiencies that
it cannot perform its wartime functions.
" C-5: Not Combat ready. Unit is undergoing a planned
period of overhaul or maintenance (Laird, 1980, p.17.)
SORTS reports unit readiness in terms of the four readiness
areas, personnel, equipment, supplies-on-hand, and training
and categorizes them with a C-rating for reporting to higher
authority.
With regard to the personnel area, a CO rates the
personnel strength of his unit in terms of wartime
requirements. In determining the overall personnel rating, he
must evaluate three manning areas, overall strength or man-
ning, manning of critical skills for the unit, and senior
personnel strength (manning in the senior petty officer ranks
E5-E9). The category in which the unit is placed is dependent
upon how it matches up against the wartime standard. The unit
assumes the C-rating for personnel of the lowest rating of the
three manning areas.
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CATEGORY C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4
A. Strength 90-100% 80-90% 70-80% <70%
B. Critical skills 85-100% 75-85% 65-75% <65%
C. Senior strength 85-100% 75-85% 65-75% <65%
With regard to equipment and supplies-on-hand, the CO
measures the physical number of major assets on hand and com-
pares this against the established wartime requirement. The
percentage of wartime requirement then determines into which
category his unit falls. This area is not concerned with the
war fighting ability of these assets. While there are several
other subareas within the supplies-on-hand area which pertain
to different types of naval units, the aircraft subarea is the
only area of interest to aviation squadrons.
CATEGORY C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4
Aircraft 90-100% 80-90% 60-80% <60%
With regard to equipment readiness, the CO evaluates his
major assets together with their on-board systems in term of
their ability to perform their assigned wartime mission. Here
actual operability of the equipment is measured and made part
of the overall readiness figure. The CO determines the
percentage of his wartime requirement which is not only on
hand but also fully capable of performing its mission. The
percentage required in this area to qualify for any category
is not as stringent as that for the supplies-on-hand area.
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Mission-essential equipment, such as weapons loaders and fuel
trucks, are also measured and compared to wartime
requirements.
CATEGORY C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4
A. Major equipment -
Aircraft 75-100% 60-75% 50-60% <50%
B. Mission-essential
equipment 90-100% 70-90% 60-70% <60%
With regard to training, the CO looks at the number of
combat ready aircrews and compares this against a standard for
each readiness category for wartime. He determines the number
of combat ready aircrews through his own community's readiness
measurement system. For the VP community this system is the
VP readiness and training system.
To determine if a crew is reportable as combat ready
within SORTS, VP COs look at each crew's ability to perform in
its primary mission areas. This determination is based on the
crew being certified, which will be explained later, and
obtaining specific additional qualifications pertaining to the
primary mission area. The C-rating in training readiness for
the squadron is determined from a percentage of the crews with
qualification in the different primary mission areas.
CATEGORY C-I C-2 C-3 C-4
Combat-ready crews 85-100% 70-85% 55-70% <55%
59
Once a CO has determined the C-ratings for his squadron in
the above four readiness areas, the overall readiness for the
squadron is the least of the readiness ratings in any of the
areas. For instance, if a squadron is C-I for training,
personnel, and equipment and supplies on hand, but C-4 for
equipment, it is considered C-4 overall. Developing ratings
for the first three readiness areas is very straightforward.
A VP squadron CO compares the war time requirement with the
personnel and aircraft on hand. The resulting percent
determines the C-Rating category for each area.
The training readiness area requires the development of a
separate measurement system to determine the number of combat
ready aircrews. Measuring training is not an exact science.
The VP community, as in other communities, requires a standar-
dized system to measure effectiveness so that comparability
among units can be established and maintained. The VP Readi-
ness system is the method designed to provide the training
readiness measurement for VP squadrons.
C. VP READINESS AND TRAINING SYSTEM
For security reasons the VP readiness and training system
can be discussed only in broad terms. However, this should
not hinder the understanding of this system itself. For more
in-depth understanding the reader is referred to the CPWP
Training and Readiness Manual.
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There are four major parts to the VP Readiness system (1)
certification, (2) advanced qualifications (quals), (3) on top
points (OTP), and (4) crew stability. The basis for recogni-
tion as a crew starts with certification. Certification means
that each crew member has completed or is current in all of
its basic requirements. These requirements are:
• NATOPS: Aircrews are required to pass tests to ensure
safe operation of the P-3 aircraft. These tests consists
of an open and closed book test and an in-flight check.
" Flight Physicals: Aircrews are required to obtain annual
flight physicals.
• Aviation Physiology: Crew members must periodically be
recertified in water survival and low pressure chamber
training.
• Basic qualifications: This requirement refers to a
battery of testing by position for minimum skills r-quired
to perform in that aircraft position. These
qualifications can be completed in the aircraft or WST.
A crew member that has been previously certified in that
qualification can certify an unqualified member.
" Cwi: A crew is not officially certified until a
crew list is published with individuals assigned to each
crew position. This list must be signed by the Commanding
Officer. It is the document used to enforce stability
requirements which will be explained later.
Once certified, a crew begins to obtain advanced
qualifications. These qua...fications, the majority of which
are ASW related, involve testing of various crew members
working as a team to perform a task. The specific crew
members involved for each qualification is dependent upon the
advanced qualification desired. These advanced qualifications
are designed to certify acceptable performance in the primary
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mission areas discussed in Chapter V. They are usually
submitted by the wing commander's staff and certified by the
squadron CO.
The third major portion of the readiness system revolves
around the concept of an OTP. An OTP is a certification that
a crew was "on top" a submarine in position to drop a weapon,
if required. Just being able to get "on top" a submarine is
the culmination of all the training efforts completed to that
point and in itself is thought to signify combat readiness.
The number of OTPs obtained over a period of time is believed
to be a very good indicator of crew performance. For this
reason, a crew is required to obtain a specific number of OTPs
over a 3-month period. OTPs can be obtained in conjunction
with advanced qualifications when possible. Time parameters,
however, are usually stricter for qualifications than for
OTPs. While most advanced qualifications are obtained in the
WST, the majority of OTPs are required to be obtained in the
aircraft on actual submarines.
The final part of the VP readiness system involves crew
stability. A crew is considered to have stability when four
critical crew members are together as a crew for a specified
uninterrupted period of time. The four critical crew members
for VP as defined by the VP Readiness Training Manual are the
PPC, TACCO, SS1, and SS3. The readiness system has specific
requirements for critical crew members to train together on
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OTPs and advanced qualifications. The system further
penalizes crews which fail to maintain crew stability.
The VP readiness system combines measurements within the
four areas previously discussed to determine the overall
readiness of each crew. Within this system the crew can fall
into one of four categories, called crew designation levels
(CDLs), Alpha (A), Bravo (B), Charlie (C), or Delta (D).
Alpha is considered the most ready and Delta is consider not
ready.
The individual ratings of each crew are combined into a
figure called Average Crew Readiness (ACR). ACR is developed
by assigning a number to each crew in a squadron, based on its
rating, thus: 1.0 for A, 0.8 for B, 0.6 for C, and .2 for D.
These numbers are then added together for all the crews in the
squadron to obtain the final squadron ACR. ACR is used widely
within the VP community to compare squadron performance and,
thus, is of much interest to this thesis.
D. PRIMARY MISSION READINESS AND THE READINESS SYSTEM
As explained in Chapter V, PMR uses flight hours to
quantify performance levels in each primary mission area.
PMR is derived from the estimates of the hours required to
achieve qualifications in these areas. While it does take
into account the need to obtain these qualifications to become
proficient in the primary mission areas, the system basically
professes that flight hours alone translate into readiness.
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These PMR flight hour estimates have come under scrutiny but,
as mentioned earlier, survive today as the major input for VP
funding.
The VP Readiness system uses the four previously specified
areas (certification, advanced quals, OTPs, and crew
stability) to quantify squadron readiness; flight hours are
not used in this readiness calculation. Herein lies a
management control problem: the majority of VP funding is
determined by PMR or flight hours but flight hours are not
used as a performance indicator in the VP readiness system.
So the system uses flight hours to justify funding and COs
must use flight hours to achieve readiness, but no link
between the two has been established.
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VII. METHODOLOGY, DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
The previous chapters discussed funding for the VP
squadrons and the important role primary mission readiness
(PMR) plays in this process. They further described the VP
readiness system and how the concept of average crew readiness
(ACR) is used as a basis for measuring squadron readiness.
The purpose of this thesis is to establish a link between PMR
and true readiness. The methodology used to achieve this
purpose is described below.
A. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
Figure 4 displays the authors' model to illustrate the
steps that occur during the process of transforming dollars
into actual readiness; it ties together the VP budgeting
process and the VP readiness system. The CPWP flight hour
Fp~lhark
Primary Mission ' TRUE




Figure 4. Model Relating Funding to True Readiness
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study establishes PmR for VP aircrews. Together, Weapon
System Trainer (WST) and flight hours satisfy this PMR
requirement. The flight hour PMR requirement (85% of the
total) is translated into dollars by multiplying the required
hours by the historical flight hour cost. WST hours, as
explained in Chapter V, are acquired by a fixed price
contract. Each squadron CO simply receives his fair share of
the contracted hours.
A CO uses flight hours and WST hours to train and to
improve readiness as measured by the VP readiness system. As
previously described, ACR is the Co's yardstick for measuring
this readiness. The VP readiness system is the management
control system he uses in deciding how to expend flight hours
and WST hours for readiness. COs typically expend more flight
hours on crews with lower readiness statistics (lower crew
designation levels (CDLs)) in order to increase their paper
readiness. This may be done without regard to their actual
need for training. The strength of the feedback loop is a
function of the CO's motivation to expend resources to
maximize paper readiness.
This thesis attempts to validate the links between flight
hours and ACR (link A in Figure 4), WST hours and ACR (link B
in Figure 4), and ACR and "true readiness" (link C in Figure
4). The process by which this validation takes place is seg-
mented into four phases. Each phase built upon the results
from the preceding phase.
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Phase one tries to substantiate links A, B, and C by using
aggregate CPWP annual and monthly data. It validated link A
on an aggregate annual basis but it was unsuccessful in
establishing links B and C. Phase two was then initiated to
support the three links using squadron monthly data. No links
were established in this phase. Phase three was an attempt to
establish the links from an entirely different perspective.
It tried to substantiate link C first by identifying effective
and less effective crews from actual operational flight data.
This method was unsuccessful because not enough less effective
crews could be identified from which to draw statistical
conclusions. Phase four was the final effort to establish
links A, B, and C. In this phase, effective and less
effective crews were subjectively identified. The flight and
training records of the individual members of these crews were
then thoroughly analyzed. While none of the three links could
be established, several characteristics were identified that
could help a commanding officer maximize his true readiness in
the future.
B. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
1. Phase One
Phase one was a broad attempt to validate the
relationship between ACR and flight hours (link A) that CPWP
uses as a tool to justify resource requirements. CPWP uses a
graph of the relationship between ACR and flight hours over
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the five year period between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year
1989, inclusive, to validate link A. The CPWP staff uses the
apparent correlation in this graph to justify the flight hour
program and to document the impact of flight hour cuts to
higher authority. The authors attempted to determine the
statistical significance of this apparent relationship. In
validating the relationship, average yearly ACR for the twelve
squadrons in CPWP was regressed against flight hours for those
years. Table 1 displays the results of this regression.
Table 1
REGRESSION OF
CPWP 5-YEAR FLIGHT HOUR TOTALS(X) and ACR(Y)
Regression Equation:Y=.40547+.000005449 X Relevance:High
Number of
Data Points R2: p-Value: t-Value: F-Test:
5 .818 .0349 '3.673 13.491
In determining the statistical significance of the
regressions and t-tests computed in this chapter, the authors
used two major parameters, R2 and p-value. R2 gives the reader
insight as to how spread out the data are about the calculated
regression equation. It is the percentage of the total
variation in a dependent variable (ACR in Table 1) that is
explained by variation in the independent variable (flight
hours in Table 1). Thus, the higher the R2 value the better.
A value of 50% indicates that a significant regression
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equation can be used to explain 50% of the variation in the Y
variable with confidence for prediction. The p-value shows
the statistical significance of the X variable in explaining
the variation in the Y variable. For the purposes of this
thesis, p-values less than .05 are considered significant. A
p-value of .05 means that there is a 95% chance that the Y
variable does indeed vary in a meaningful way with the X
variable. Thus, there is only a 5 percent chance that the
apparent relationship is purely coincidental. For the purpose
of prediction, an R2 of less than 50% is not reliable even if
the relationship between X and Y is significant. Therefore,
the overall relevance of a particular regression or T-test is
dependent on both the R2 and p-value. A high relevance, as
indicated in the table, is a combination of R2 of over 50% and
a p-value of .05 or less. Other statistical test data are
provided as amplifying information for the reader.
The results of Table 1 show a significant relationship
between ACR (yearly CPWP Average) and flight hours (yearly
CPWP total). As R2 shows, the regression equation explains
81.8% of the variation. The regression equation indicates
that ACR would be 40.5% without any hours flown; flying 1835
hours would increase ACR by 1%. While the equation has some
error associated with it, it does validate CPWP's use of
flight hours to maintain ACR. Essentially, if a flight hour
cut takes place at the beginning of a fiscal year, CPWP can
predict what the overall reduction in ACR will be at the end
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of that year. No data were available at this level to
substantiate CPWP's assumption that WST hours played a minimal
role in ACR changes.
Having established a strong link at the Wing level,
the next step involved breaking down the yearly numbers into
monthly ACR/flight hour figures. A relationship here would
enable CPWP to determine the effect of flight hour cuts on ACR
at any time during the fiscal year. Table 2 shows a simple




CPWP MONTHLY FLIGHT HOURS(X) and ACR(Y)
Regression Equation: Y=.698 + .00001768 X Relevance:Low
Number of
Data Points R2: p-Value: t-Value: F-Test:
24 .128 =.0867 1.793 3.216
The data showed that total hours, as a predictor of
ACR, were not significant at the 95% confidence level
(p=.0867). R-square of .128 indicates that, even if the
relationship were significant, it could explain only 12.8% of
the variation in ACR. In view of this weak relationship,
attempts were made to evaluate the effect of time on the data.
This was done by lagging ACR from one to six months to deter-
mine whether the flight hours expended today affect ACR later.
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Lagging data allows one to determine if flight hours expended
in previous months had an effect on future readiness. The
tabulated results are shown in Table 3.
A lag of one month showed a significant relationship
between ACR and hours expended the previous month. However,
this relationship does not explain much of the variation in
data and therefore cannot be interpreted as a strong
validation of link A. As can be seen from the rest of the
data in the table, continuing to lag ACR from two to five
months showed no significant relationships at the .05 level.
Table 3
EFFECT OF CPWP MONTHLY FLIGHT HOURS ON ACR OVER TIME
R2: p-Value: F-Test:
1 month later 0.1710 0.0497 4.338
2 months later 0.1770 0.0515 4.290
3 months later 0.0250 0.4911 0.493
4 months later 0.0060 0.7424 0.111
5 months later 0.0090 0.7016 0.152
Since WST usage is fixed and limited, CPWP has
presumed that changes in ACR are dependent upon flight hour
funding allocations alone. In effect, CPWP has assumed link
B not to be of significance. WST hours data are available and
tracked at the CPWP level so link B (WST to ACR) could be
evaluated. The authors therefore chose to test CPWP's
hypothesis about the significance of this link. Table 4 shows
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the results of this regression. The regression validates the
CPWP assumption that WST usage is not significant in
explaining ACR variation.
In attempting to validate link C at the CPWP level,
the authors had iifficulty developing a method to quantify
actual readiness of the entire Wing during a period as
compared to ACR for the same period. Efforts to develop a
method were deemed impracticable. Too many factors, both
Table 4
REGRESSION OF
CPWP MONTHLY WST HOURS(X) and ACR(Y)
Regression Equation: Y=0.761+.0000717 X Relevance:Low
Number of
Data Points R2 : p-Value: t-Value: F-Test:
24.09 =.1545 1.475 2.174
controllable and uncontrollable, affect performance at this
level that a paradigm to capture all these factors could not
be developed. Even had the authors been able to develop a
model, data are not maintained at the Wing level to support
testing. The search then continued at the squadron level to
establish the links.
2. Phase Two
Phase two began by analyzing data submitted monthly to
CPWP by all the squadrons within that command. These data,
broken down by squadron and month, include squadron number,
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ACR, the number of on-top points (OTPs) obtained in a
particular month, on station effectiveness (OSE) yrades earned
during the month, and flight and WST hours expended during a
month. The thesis attempted to validate links A and B by
using these monthly squadron data. Table 5 presents the
results of a regression of monthly ACR to monthly flight hour
data over the past two fiscal years for the twelve squadrons
within CPWP. No significant relationship was established
(p=.1085). The number of data points is 282 vice 288 because
some of the squadrons did not have to report ACR for several
months due to transitioning to updated aircraft.
Table 5
REGRESSION OF
SQUADRON MONTHLY FLIGHT HOURS(X) and ACR(Y)
Regression Equation: Y=0.765 + .0000714 X Relevance:Low
Number of
Data Points R2: p-Value: t-Value: F-Test:
F 282 .009 .1085 1.161 2.592
Table 6 shows the regression of monthly WST hours to
monthly ACR at the squadron level. Again no significant




SQUADRON MONTHLY WST HOURS(X) and ACR(Y)
Regression Equation: Y=0.785 + .00003283 X Relevance:Low
Number of
Data Points R2: p-Value: t-Value: F-Test:
282 .009 .1201 1.559 2.431
Finally a regression of total hours (WST and Flight
hours combined) to ACR was attempted to evaluate a possible
aggregate relationship. Table 7 shows the results of this
regression. With an R2 of only .016, the regression equation
can not reliably predict ACR from WST and flight hours, even
though the very small relationship observed is significant.
Table 7
REGRESSION OF
SQUADRON MONTHLY WST & FLIGHT HOURS(X) and ACR(Y)
Regression Equation: Y=0.744 + .0001038 X Relevance:Low
Number of
Data Points R2 : p-Value: t-Value: F-Test:
282 .016 .0334 2.138 0.45,
An attempt was then made to lag these data but, again,
no substantial relationships were obtained. The results are
tabulated in Table 8 on the following page. Therefore, there
was no separate link A or B and no combined link established
by using the CPWP data at the squadron level. The same
reasons a link C could not be tested at the CPWP level held
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true in establishing one at the squadron level. For this
reason, a phase three was attempted to overcome the previous
problems in coming to grips with validating link C.
3. Phase Three
The purpose of phase three was to validate links A, B,
and C from a different perspective. In order to accomplish
this, the authors decided to look first at link C (ACR to true
readiness) for a relationship. If this relationship is estab-
lished, then attempts to validate links A and B would proceed.
Table 8
EFFECT OF
SQUADRON MONTHLY WST & FLIGHT HOURS ON ACR OVER TIME
R2: p-Value: F-Test:
Flight Hours:
1 month later 0.0060 0.1921 1.7100
2 months later 0.0240 0.0129 6.2660
3 months later 0.0260 0.0120 6.4000
4 months later 0.0340 0.0043 8.3140
WST Hours: 11.296
1 month later 0.0400 0.0090
2 months later 0.0670 0.0010 18.476
3 months later 0.0660 0.0001 17.179
4 months later 0.0610 0.0001 15.157
WST & Flt Hours:
1 month later 0.0020 0.5106 0.4340
2 months later 0.1200 0.0736 3.2267
3 months later 0.0140 0.0619 3.5180
4 months later 0.0230 0.0204 5.4480
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The authors reviewed over 500 operational flights
which occurred during fiscal year 1989 by using the CPWP
RAINFORM data base. Operational flights involve flying
missions on non-US submarines where the submarine's intent is
not known. After each crew debrief, pertinent data about the
particular operational flight are added to the database. The
reason this database was chosen was because it is the only
data maintained which reflect how a crew might perform in a
wartime scenario. The authors thought that choosing training
data would introduce biases, since more artificialities are
present on a training mission. These artificialities include
restrictions on the number and types of buoys that can be
dropped and prior knowledge of submarine position to
regenerate contact.
Initially, all 500 flights were reviewed and put into
two categories. If a flight had any contact with a submarine
it was placed into one category and all no-contact flights in
another. The contact flights were then entered into a
database. The database included significant phenomena such as
event times, target, crew number, PPC, TACCO, SS1 and mission
summary information. Table 9 illustrates the composition of
this database. The data in Table 9 have been modified to
prevent disclosure of classified information. Classified
data, however, were used by the authors in the search for
effective and ineffective crews. The authors wanted to enter
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labeled as effective or less effective, a greater spectrum of
data could be analyzed to account for performance disparities.
The flight data were analyzed to evaluate if specific
crews distinguished themselves as being particularly effective
or not effective in the ASW mission. This was done by reading
the mission summary, comparing it with on-station
effectiveness (OSE) grades, if assigned, and target tracking
information. From this analysis, the event was subjectively
given one of three grades: Good, Bad, or Questionable.
Questionable flights would be used later to help classify
crews that appeared to be marginally good or bad.
Once the event was assigned a grade, the database was
sorted by grade, squadron, and crew number. This sort helped
in the identification of crew performing consistently "good"
or "bad". The authors wanted to find crews with several good
or several bad flights to qualify as effective or less
effective crews. After looking at the limited operational
flight experience of many crews, the authors decided three
good or three bad flights would initially distinguish
effective from less effective crews. Ten good crews and one
bad crew were identified by this method.
Three circumstances, however, prevented continued
analysis. First, one bad crew was not enough from which to
draw statistical conclusions. Second, of the ten good crews,
six were no longer formed because critical crew members had
transferred and specific required data were no longer
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available. Finally, some of the good crews also had
questionable and bad flights, which brought into question
their true status.
The authors spent over 100 man hours compiling the
database. Yet, because of the limited number of operational
flights per crew, finding consistently bad performance was not
possible to document. This fact, coupled with the nonstandar-
dized way in which the RAINFORM database is entered, prevented
further analysis in this phase. The following were specific
problems that were encountered with the database.
" Thirty percent of all the flights reviewed had grades of
"pending" or "waived" for OSE.
" The Debriefing Officer's (DBO) name was seldom entered, so
evaluation of DBO grading history was not possible.
" Contact time developed at debrief and entered into the
RAINFORM database did not match the mission commander's
analysis of contact time which is also entered into the
RAINFORM database.
" The OSE grade and mission summary do not correlate for all
flights when an OSE is waived or pending. The mission
summary does not specify how the crew actually performed
in these cases. If OSEs were pending, no follow-up
messages could be found to update the database.
" Crew designation level (CDL), while required to be entered
in the RAINFORM database, is seldom entered. This
prevents a quick check of the VP readiness system as a
performance indicator.
Although phase three did not produce the three links
as hoped, the authors obtained a great deal of information for
conclusions and further studies to enhance the system.
Failure in this phase led to phase four.
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4. Phase Four
Since the researchers were unable to distinguish
effective from less effective crews in phase three by using
operational data, phase four was undertaken. A decision was
made to request three COs of the available squadrons at
Moffett Field to identify their best and worst performing
crews during the previous five month period. The authors
determined that squadron COs were the only individuals that
could subjectively determine effective and less effective
crews within their squadrons for several reasons. First, in
time of war, the CO would be the one selecting crews for
various missions and he is ultimately responsible for ensuring
they are all ready for war. Second, the CO constantly changes
his ranking based on actual performance. Third, according to
Anthony and Herzlinger,
A judgement made by a qualified person is usually a better
measure of the quality of performance than any objective
measure.. .humans incorporate in their judgement the effect
of circumstances and nuances of performance that no set of
objective measures can take into account. (Anthony and
Herzlinger, 1980, p.237)
Finally, five crews selected by the COs matched four
effective crews and one less effective crew identified in
phase three, thereby offering some confirmation of this
methodology. It is the opinion of the authors that, for these
reasons, the potential bias that might have been introduced by
using this subjective approach is therefore greatly mitigated.
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Once it was decided that COs would subjectively
determine the crews that attained "true readiness" and those
that had fallen somewhat short, the authors selected three
squadrons to begin their investigation. The three squadrons
that were chosen were determined to be about equal in
perceived performance by the Wing 10 staff. These squadron
COs were surveyed and asked to identify their two most
effective and two least effective crews. A requirement was
forced upon them that the PPC, TACCO and SS1 had to have been
flying as a crew for at least the past five months (August
1989 to January 1990).
Once the crews had been identified, the process of
data collection began. The authors gathered the PPC, TACCO,
and SS1 flight log books, readiness records, and training
jackets for each of the identified crews. Data were then
recorded to obtain tufe information necessary to distinguish
the two groups. Table 10 on the following page displays the
data gathering sheets. The authors validated data whenever
possible with data maintained at Wing 10.
Since VP performs many missions and this thesis con-
centrates on ASW readiness, the authors chose to concentrate
gathering information on only ASW-related flights and flights
which had the potential to increase crew coordination. It was
very difficult to gather all the needed information from the
different squadrons because squadrons perform the admin-






items which were not logged consistently from individual to
individual and squadron to squadron (such as Fleet Replacement
Squadron (FRS) grades, A-school grades for the SS1, and flight
school grades for the officers) could not be analyzed further.
Once the data were collected, attempts were made to
validate link C (ACR to true readiness). Table 11 shows the
result of a T-test to test this relationship. The test used
the five month CDL average for each effective crew and com-
pared these to the same figures for less effective crews. As
can be seen from Table 11, there was a difference. Less
effective crews had an average CDL .133 lower than that of
effective crews. However, this difference was not significant
at the 95% level.
Table 11
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF 5 MONTH CDL AVERAGE
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews .920 .110 .045
6 Less Effective Crews .787 .161 .066
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
1.671 0.1256 Low
A further test was made to see if flight hours could
be used to predict readiness for the six effective and six
less effective crews. This was done by regressing the crews
monthly flight hours over the five month period and comparing
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this to the monthly CDLs for each of the twelve crews in
question. Table 12 provides the results of this regression.
Table 12
REGRESSION OF
MONTHLY CREW FLIGHT HOURS(X) and MONTHLY CREW CDL(Y)
Regression Equation: Y=0.835 + .0.001 X Relevance:Low
Number of
Data Points R2 : p-Value: t-Value: F-Test:
60 .007 .5173 0.651 0.424
As can be seen from the table, this relationship is not
significant (p=.5173 and R2=.007). Attempts to lag the data
did not improve this relationship, as can be seen in Table 13.
The data could not be lagged for more than two months because
of unavailability of additional data.
Table 13
EFFECT OF CREW FLIGHT HOURS ON CDL OVER TIME
Crew Flt Hours: R2: p-Value: F-Test:
1 month later 0.0050 0.6386 0.2240
2 months later 0.0880 0.0795 3.2670
The last attempt to validate link A at this level used
each crew's five month average CDL and the total flight hours
flown by each crew over these five months. Table 14 shows the
regression of these data. While there appears to be a
relationship here, the R2 of .391 does not explain much of the
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variation in the data. Link A validation at this level can
therefore be described only as moderate.
Table 14
REGRESSION OF
CREW 5 MONTH TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS(X) and CDL AVERAGE(Y)
Regression Equation: Y=0.671 + 0.001 X Relevance:Low
Number of
Data Points R2: p-Value: t-Value: F-Test:
12 .391 .0298 2.532 6.411
Link B (WST hours to ACR/CDL) could not be established
because these crews spent only limited time in the trainer.
This is not unique to these crews and, at least at this level,
link B is not significant (as CPWP assumed at its level).
Crews not utilizing the trainer at all for five months can
still maintain their readiness as measured by the VP readiness
system. This may indicate a flaw in the readiness system.
The final portion of the research was to evaluate
various characteristics of the key crew members to see if they
could be used to distinguish effective from less effective
crews. This was done so that COs might be able to use
criteria other than those measured in the current readiness
system to more efficiently train their crews. The authors
compared NATOPS open book test results, closed book test
results, and flight grades of the PPC, TACCO, and SS1, their
years in the service, the time it took each crew member to
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become fully designated in position, the average days layoff
between flights and WSTs, the average OSEs each crew received,
the number of months the various crew members had been flying
together, and total flight time by position. Table 15
presents a synopsis of the findings listed in order of
significance. As can be seen from the table, there were three
characteristics significant at the 95% level: the number of
months the TACCO and SS1 were on the crew together, the
designation time for the TACCO and the average days between
flights and WSTs. Refer to Appendix B for complete results
from each test. The conclusions and recommendations from this
and other tests in this chapter are discussed in the final
chapter.
Table 15
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
CREW OVERALL AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
CHARACTERISTICS p-VALUE RELEVANCE
Months For TACCO to 0.0020 High
Complete Designation
Months TACCO and SS1 0.0172 High
on Crew Together
Average Days Between 0.0378 High
Flights or WSTs
TACCO NATOPS Open Book 0.0782 Marginal
Test Score
Crew Average OSE Score 0.1005 Marginal




Months Pilot and SS1 0.1957 Low
on Crew Together
Months Pilot and TACCO 0.1957 Low
on Crew Together
SS1 Career Flight 0.2949 Low
Hours
TACCO NATOPS Flight 0.3091 Low
Test Score
SS1 NATOPS Open Book 0.3235 Low
Test Score
TACCO NATOPS Closed 0.4364 Low
Book Test Score
Pilot NATOPS Flight 0.4516 Low
Test Score
Pilot NATOPS Open Book 0.5167 Very Low
Test Score
Pilot NATOPS Closed 0.6171 Very Low
Book Test Score
Pilot Career Flight 0.6423 Very Low
Hours
Pilot Months in 0.6491 Very Low
Service
Months For SS1 to 0.6664 Very Low
Complete Designation
TACCO Career Flight 0.7065 Very Low
Hours
Months For Pilot to 0.9463 Very Low
Complete Designation
SS1 Months in Service 0.9586 Very Low
TACCO Months in 0.9643 Very Low
Service
SS1 NATOPS Closed Book 1.0000 Very Low
Test Score
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMKN ATIONS
This chapter provides a concise interpretation of the
findings from the previously described research. Six
recommendations are made to present the most significant
adjustments which can be made to improve the current VP readi-
ness system. Finally, since this thesis was a first look at
evaluating the current readiness system in its entirety, the
authors provide focused direction for further research.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions are broken into three subsections dealing
with Link A and B, Link C, and training characteristics.
1. Link A and B Conclusions
The following are conclusions regarding the research
into developing links A and B:
" There is a valid link A between annual flight hours and
ACR at the CPWP level. The graph of flight hours to ACR
that CPWP staff uses to justify flight hour requests is
significant.
" Once the above analysis is disaggregated to monthly
figures, however, the relationship is no longer valid.
• No link A relationship could be established by using
squadron or crew ACR/CDL and flight hour figures.
• Link B (WST hours to ACR) could not be established at any
level.
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The authors believe disaggregating the yearly CPWP
figures did not establish a significant relationship because
lagging the data could not capture the correlation between
flight hours expended in one month and future ACR. The
authors do not believe there is a constant effect of flight
hours expended in one month to future ACR. This relationship
most probably varies from one month to the next and from one
squadron to another because of the training environment. The
repetition and duration of the flights during the month as
well as the way the training is administered all effect the
retention of training skills. This all serves to "muddy" the
disaggregated relationship between flight hours and ACR. When
annual aggregate flight hours are used, the majority of this
training retention variable is captured to provide the
observed significant relationship.
The authors were not able to establish link B (WST
hours and ACR) because WSTs, for the most part, are utilized
100 percent. The WSTs provide virtually the same degree of
readiness to the system month after month. WSTs play a minor
role in the currently configured VP readiness system.
The existence or nonexistence of link A and B alone
does not shed light on resource usage and it's effect on true
readiness. Flight hours expended to increase ACR may or may
not be increasing true readiness. The readiness system may
stress certain accomplishments and qualifications which might
not affect true readiness. Unless link C can be established,
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one cannot know how effective the current VP readiness system
is. Establishment of this link is paramount to knowing what
factors should be stressed in the computation of ACR/CDL.
2. Link C Conclusions
The conclusions from this subsection have been divided
into two parts, for phase three and phase four. Phase three
was designed from the outset to develop link C. While the
actual link could not be established, several conclusions were
developed from the data collection process in this phase.
" VP crews and debriefing officers are not providing all
information required to make the RAINFORM database useful.
Proper information, when entered, provides an historical
perspective on the performance of individual crews.
Specific data entry requirements were outlined in the
previous chapter.
Too many on-station-effectiveness(OSEs) grades are waived
or left pending with no apparent follow-up. Of the
operational events evaluated in Chapter VII, 55 percent of
bad flights, 66 percent of questionable flights and 15
percent of good flights were waived or pending.
If the information is entered into the database to
provide a basis for improving future performance and to focus
future training requirements, all information should be
provided to the system. Apparently, DBOs have little problem
labeling a good flight as "good". However, they have a
problem labeling a bad flight as "bad". Bad flights provide
as much or, perhaps, more information for improving crew
performance as do good flights. Grading and full disclosure
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of all flights, and in particular bad flights, are crucial to
improving the VP training system.
In phase four, Link C could not be established at the
95 percent significance level by using individual crew data.
Since this final step could not establish link C, one can only
conclude that the VP readiness system appears to be a poor
indicator of true readiness. This gives credence to the
belief that the readiness system may measure factors that do
not affect true readiness. It may also not measure other
factors which have a significant impact on true readiness.
3. Training Characteristics Conclusions
This final section deals with the 23 characteristics
which were analyzed in phase four. The findings in phase
four, coupled with concepts introduced in Chapter III,
provide the basis for this section's conclusions.
" The TACCO and SSl appear to be the critical crew members
for VP ASW missions. The current readiness system
stresses performance by three crew members on ASW
missions: PPC, TACCO, and SS1. It appears the
performances of the TACCO and SS1 outweigh that of the PPC
on these missions. The current VP readiness system should
reflect this.
" Phase four results indicated that limiting the layoff
between flights or WSTs rather than "lumping" activity,
with longer idle periods between events, improves crew
performance. This confirms Chapter III findings.
Training should be conducted with distributed methodology
in mind. Repetition spread over a period of time
improves performance as compared to "lumping" training
together.
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" Comparing NATOPs grades for crew members is of little
value in separating effective from less effective
performance.
• Total individual flights as well as time in service cannot
be used to distinguish effective and less effective crews.
" The OSE grading system is at best marginally effective in
distinguishing effective from less effective crews. This
is most likely due to the fact that "bad" or "ques-
tionable" flights are often not graded, so OSE averages
are inflated and probably not a true indicator of crew
performance.
B. RECOMENDATIONS
Based on the arguments and facts presented in this thesis,
the following recommendations are offered to help the VP com-
munity in obtaining better performance for its resources:
• CPWP should review the current readiness system with an
eye towards incorporating crew flight/WST hours into the
ACR calculation. In doing this, CPWP can directly
establish link A (flight hours and ACR) and link B (WST
hours and ACR) so that PMR and true readiness are
correlated at all levels of command. The readiness
system, as currently configured, interferes with the
incorporation of flight and WST hours.
" CPWP should choose a test squadron on which to perform
training research. Once identified, the crews within the
squadron should be divided into two groups. One group of
crews would be designated the control group and would
maintain training practices as prescribed by the current
VP readiness system. The other group would train without
regard to the current readiness system. This group would
train by means of some structured experimental distributed
training program. After an extended period of time, the
two groups of crews would then undergo standardized
testing (such as an operational readiness exercise (ORE))
to compare performance. Based on the results observed
from these, tests the VP community would then be in a
better position to make readiness system changes.
" If the VP community continues to rely on the RAINFORM
database to provide an historical perspective on
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performance, it should ensure that all data are entered
consistently and completely. CPWP should also ensure that
the assignment of waived and pending flight grades is
limited so that data on average OSEs are not biased. If
the VP community is going to have an OSE grading system,
it should use the complete system in grading flights.
CPWP should look at grading flights according to five
appropriately weighted facets so that OSEs and,




3. Contact class difficulty,
4. Contact maneuver during prosecution, and
5. Crew use of tactics, conformity to briefed
procedures, and appropriate use of the aircraft,
given the tactical situation.
Currently, a crew is graded only on its performance with
regard to the fifth facet. Comparing a crew that obtains
a 100 OSE by tracking, with a functioning computer, a loud
target which does not maneuver in quiet water is hardly
comparable to tracking, without the use of a computer, a
maneuvering quiet target within a shipping lane.
Improvements should be made to the grading system so that
training effectiveness and performance on different
flights can be compared more effectively.
The readiness system should be reviewed and revised in
order for it to be tied closer to the SORTs system. SORTs
is the system by which the President ultimately receives
readiness information on all military units. The system is
standardized for all units. A VP readiness system that
ties directly into SORTs would ease readiness reporting by
squadron COs by allowing the VP community's internal
readiness reporting system to be compatible with its
external one.
It is recognized that CPWP has limited manpower resources
and expertise to perform the full analysis needed to
evaluate the current VP readiness system. Once a
methodology has been devised to assess the system, CPWP
should use Naval Postgraduate School thesis students to
perform the various parts of the needed analysis. The
Naval Postgraduate School has many students with a VP
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background, who can and are willing to perform the
required analysis.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH
Additional research into phase four of this thesis could
provide significant findings which then could be used as the
driving force in further revision of the current VP readiness
system. This thesis found three significant factors that
could be tracked in a revised readiness system. New studies
could be initiated to take a more in-depth look at these
factors to find the underlying elements in these factors which
can be used to distinguish between good and bad performance.
A broader study can also be made to evaluate more
characteristics which separate the truly effective performing
crews.
Finally, research could be focused on the RAINFORM
database. The RAINFORM database was not developed to evaluate
operational crew performance. Further study should be
conducted into developing a performance database for VP
aircrews. Adjustments and additions to the RAINFORM database
would undoubtedly need to be made to tailor a system for





ACR Average Crew Readiness
ASVAB Armed Services Aptitude Battery Test
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
AW Anti-Submarine Warfare Rating
CDL Crew Designation Level
CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CNAP Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CO Commanding Officer
CPWP Commander, Patrol Wings, U.S. Pacific Fleet
DOD Department of Defense
ESM Electronic Support Measures
FASO Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training
Group
FE Flight Engineer
FRS Fleet Replacement Squadron
FY Fiscal year
GAO General Accounting Office
GRH Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
IFT In-flight Technician
MAD Magnetic Anomaly Detection
MOE Measure of Effectiveness
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MPA Maritime Patrol Aviation
NAV/COMM Navigator/Communicator
NATOPS Naval Air Training and Operations Procedures
Standardization
NFO Naval Flight Officer
OPTAR Operating Target
OSE On-station Effectiveness
OTP On top point
PMR Primary Mission Readiness
PPC Patrol Plane Commander
R/A Ready Alert
SORTS Status of Resources and Training System
SS1 Sensor Station One Operator
SS2 Sensor Station Two Operator
SS3 Sensor Station Three Operator
TACCO Tactical Coordinator




UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
MONTHS FOR TACCO TO COMPLETE DESIGNATION
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 15.5 6.221 2.540
6 Less Effective Crews 8.00 1.673 0.683
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
2.852 .0172 High
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
MONTHS TACCO AND SS1 ON CREW TOGETHER
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 19.833 1.941 .792
5 Less Effective Crews 25.800 2.683 1.20




UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS BETWEEN FLIGHTS OR WSTs
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 6.003 1.183 0.483
6 Less Effective Crews 9.340 2.683 1.300
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
2.392 10.378 High
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
TACCO NATOPS OPEN BOOK TEST SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.972 0.0690 0.028
4 Less Effective Crews 3.790 0.2090 0.105
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
=2.019 0.0782 Marginal
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
CREW AVERAGE OSE SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 96.60 4.2420 1.732
6 Less Effective Crews 88.15 10.622 4.336




UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
SS1 NATOPS FLIGHT TEST SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.742 0.138 0.056
6 Less Effective Crews 3.610 0.129 0.053
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
1.712 0.1177 Marginal
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
MONTHS PILOT AND SS1 ON CREW TOGETHER
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 11.333 5.645 2.305
6 Less Effective Crews 8.000 1.673 0.683
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
IL1.387 - 0.197 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
MONTHS PILOT AND TACCO ON CREW TOGETHER
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 11.333 5.645 2.305
6 Less Effective Crews 8.000 1.673 0.683




UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
SS1 CAREER FLIGHT HOURS
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 1344.167 480.487 196.158
6 Less Effective Crews 994.833 607.018 :247.814
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
1.105 10.2949 1 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
TACCO NATOPS FLIGHT TEST SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.758 0.107 0.044
4 Less Effective Crews 3.665 0.168 0.084
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
1086 =0.3091 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
SS1 NATOPS OPEN BOOK TEST SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.752 0.173 0.070
6 Less Effective Crews 3.855 0.172 0.070




UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
TACCO NATOPS CLOSED BOOK TEST SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.883 0.194 0.07
4 Less Effective Crews 3.775 0.222 0.111
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
0.819 10.4364 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
PILOT NATOPS FLIGHT TT SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.867 0.082 0.034
6 Less Effective Crews 3.830 0.080 0.033
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
0.783 10.4516 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
PILOT NATOPS OPEN BOOK TEST SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.888 0.136 0.055
6 Less Effective Crews 3.833 0.148 0.060




UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
PILOT NATOPS CLOSED BOOK TEST SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.767 0.163 0.067
6 Less Effective Crews 3.817 0.172 0.070
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
-0.516 10.6171 LOW
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
PILOT CAREER FLIGHT HOURS
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 1662.833 830.842 339.190
6 Less Effective Crews 1935.667 1121.171 457.716
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
1-0.479 10.6423 1 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
PILOT MONTHS IN SERVICE
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 77.000 44.806 18.292
6 Less Effective Crews 89.333 46.259 18.885




UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
MONTHS FOR SS1 TO COMPLETE DESIGNATION
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 19.667 6.346 2.591
6 Less Effective Crews 18.167 5.307 2.167
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
0.444 0.6664 1 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
TACCO CAREER FLIGHT HOURS
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 1761.000 776.682 317.079
6 Less Effective Crews 1615.833 488.361 199.372
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
0.388 10.7065 1 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
MONTHS FOR PILOT TO COMPLETE DESIGNATION
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 22.833 1 3.312 1.352
6 Less Effective Crews 23.000 4.899 2.000




UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
SS1 MONTHS IN SERVICE
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 62.667 39.868 16.276
6 Less Effective Crews 61.167 56.386 23.019
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
10.053 0.9586 -LOW
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
TACCO MONTHS IN SERVICE
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 71.500 48.891 19.960
6 Less Effective Crews 72.667 38.459 15.701
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
-0.046 10.9643 Low
UNPAIRED t-TEST OF EFFECTIVE AND LESS EFFECTIVE CREWS
TESTING SIGNIFICANCE OF
SS1 NATOPS CLOSED BOOK TEST SCORES
Mean: St. Dev: St. Err:
6 Effective Crews 3.600 0.261 0.106
6 Less Effective Crews 3.600 0.228 0.093
Overall Results of Test
t-Value: p-Value: Relevance:
0 I. 000 Lo I
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